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YOSSARIAN'S NIGHTMARE: A "CATCH-22" BETWEEN
AMERICAN GRAND JURY POWERS AND SWISS
NONDISCLOSURE LAWS-A NEW SOLUTION
Christopher D. Liguori*
INTRODUCTION
Yossarian looked at him soberly and tried another approach. "Is Orr crazy?"
"He sure is," Doc Daneeka said.
"Can you ground him?"
"I sure can. But first he has to ask me to. That's part of the rule."
"Then why doesn't he ask you to?"
"Because he's crazy," Doc Daneeka said. "He has to be crazy to keep flying
combat missions after all the close calls he has had. Sure, I can ground Orr. But
first he has to ask me to."
"That's all he has to do to be grounded?" Yossarian asked.
"That's all. Let him ask me."
"And then you can ground him?" Yossarian asked.
"No. Then I can't ground him."
"You mean there's a catch?"
"Sure there's a catch," Doc Daneeka replied."Catch-22. Anyone who wants to
get out of combat duty isn't really crazy."
.. . Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of
Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle.'
United States criminal actions involving foreign entities often require
production of documents located abroad. Resolution of these disputes
depends on whether such documents are obtainable. In many instances,
however, foreign nondisclosure laws prohibit compliance with United
States grand jury document subpoenas. An example of such a conflict
involves legal actions between the United States and subsidiaries of
Swiss corporations in which a United States grand jury must contend
with Swiss nondisclosure laws.
A United States grand jury may subpoena documents located
abroad,2 however, enforceability of this subpoena becomes a difficult
* J.D., 1987, Washington College of Law, The American University. The author
would like to thank Marshall Silverberg for his assistance in preparing this Comment.
1. J. HELLER, CATCH-22 46-47 (1955).
2. See, e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 US. 541, 552 (1908)
(holding that grand jury subpoena of private books and documents is not beyond the
scope of power provided in the state statute); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium
Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 404, 407 n.2 (5th Cir. 1976) (concerning subpoena of bank
records located in the Cayman Islands); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank. 396
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issue when the subpoena requires a foreign party to violate its domestic
nondisclosure laws.3 Party litigants who possess the requested docu-
ments face a "Catch-22" similar to Yossarian's; whichever order is
obeyed precipitates a violation of the other nation's law.4 Furthermore,
if the nondisclosure laws are observed, proper adjudication of the dis-
pute may prove impossible.
This Comment explores the conflict between the broad powers of a
United States grand jury and the strict nondisclosure laws of Switzer-
land.5 Part I provides a brief overview of the powers of the grand jury
and the relevant provisions of the Swiss Penal Code. Part II surveys
past solutions to this conflict and comments on their ineffectiveness.
Part III critiques United States courts recent efforts to reconcile the
broad powers of the grand jury with the restrictive prohibitions of
Swiss law. Part IV discusses nonjudicial proposals to resolve this con-
flict. Finally, Part V recommends that the United States and Switzer-
F.2d 897, 900 (2d Cir. 1968) (involving subpoena of German bank records in an anti-
trust action); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959)
(ruling that a national bank with a Panama branch could not defeat IRS summons for
production of foreign records on grounds that the subpoena violates Panamanian law),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960); SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215,
218-19 (9th Cir. 1945) (requiring Mexican subsidiary to produce books and records
located in Mexico for SEC investigation); In re Equitable Plan Co., 185 F. Supp. 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (requiring the production of evidence from Canada), modified on
other grounds sub nom. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); Societe Inter-
nationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (ordering production of Swiss
company's records located in Switzerland despite prohibitions of Swiss law), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (issuing
grand jury subpoena duces tecum for Canadian corporation's business records).
3. See generally Comment, International Paper Chase: Federal Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum in Conflict with Swiss Nondisclosure Law, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L
L. 149, 152 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, International Paper Chase] (noting that
"The Marc Rich court overstepped its authority when it . . . ordered Marc Rich to
produce documents in contravention of Swiss law").
4. See Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948), vacating In re Luma Camera Service,
Inc., 157 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1946). The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit's
finding of civil contempt for a bankrupt's failure to comply with a turnover order. Id. at
77. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of contempt despite com-
menting that: "[a]lthough we know that [the bankrupt] . . . cannot comply with the
order, we must keep a straight face and pretend that he can, and thus must affirm
orders which first direct [the bankrupt] . . . 'to do an impossibility, and then punish
him for refusal to perform it.'" In re Luma Camera Service, Inc., 157 F.2d 951, 955
(2d cir. 1946), quoted in Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power to Compel
Acts Violating Foreign Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1470-71 (1963) [hereinafter
Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power].
5. This article only addresses the issue of whether a United States court, having
personal jurisdiction over a party, can order that party to produce documents located
overseas. It does not address the issue of whether a United States court has the juris-
diction to compel the party's compliance.
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land negotiate a bilateral treaty requiring Swiss companies transacting
business in the United States and United States companies doing busi-
ness in Switzerland to keep duplicates of all business records available
in each country for production.
I. UNITED STATES GRAND JURY AND SWISS NON-
DISCLOSURE LAWS
A. POWERS OF THE GRAND JURY
The United States Constitution requires a grand jury indictment to
shield persons from unfounded or arbitrary criminal charges. The Con-
stitution also provides for a criminal investigation unimpeded by re-
strictions imposed on a trial court.' To this end, the grand jury con-
ducts ex parte investigations to determine whether probable cause
exists to believe an individual committed a crime and, therefore,
whether a prosecutor should institute criminal proceedings.
7
The grand jury possesses the authority to subpoena witnesses to tes-
tify8 and to require a witness to provide physical evidence.0 The federal
circuit courts are split with respect to whether the government, in ob-
taining judicial enforcement of a grand jury subpoena, must make
some showing that the material sought is relevant to the investigation.10
6. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (plurality opinion)
(dictum) (observing that a grand jury protects against arbitrary and oppresive action
because it requires a group of peers to bring charges).
7. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (maintaining that
grand jury's function is to determine whether probable cause exists); cf. Marc Rich and
Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1983) (dictum) (investigat-
ing foreign corporation's possible criminal activity is within scope of grand jury's au-
thority), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d
1182, 1184 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); United States v.
Strauss, 678 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 911 (1982).
8. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972) (reaffirming the gov-
ernment's power to compel persons to appear and testify before grand jury); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532 F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1976)
(stating that a grand jury's authority to subpoena witnesses is essential) (citing
Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1973)).
9. See FED. R. CRibi. P. 17(c) (promulgating that "[a] subpoena may also com-
mand the person to whom it is directed to produce books, papers, documents or other
objects designated therein").
10. Compare In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dorokee Co.) 697 F.2d
277, 281 (10th Cir. 1983) (requiring preliminary demonstration that material sought is
relevant and regarding the sworn testimony of an F.B.I. agent as a sufficient showing)
and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973) (requir-
ing preliminary showing by affidavit that each item is relevant to a grand jury investi-
gation and not sought for another purpose before the government can obtain handwrit-
ing exemplars, fingerprints, and mugshots) with In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Slaughter), 694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (11 th Cir. 1982) (allowing the government to obtain
records without showing that the information is relevant to investigating an attorney's
1987]
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A party litigant must control the documents that a grand jury seeks to
obtain." A party's refusal to obey a grand jury order may result in a
finding of contempt and a fine or imprisonment for up to eighteen
months. 2
B. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF Swiss LAW
Articles 271, 273, and 292 of the Swiss Penal Code and article 102
of the Swiss Constitution deal with foreign-based attempts to obtain
documents. According to the government of Switzerland, these provi-
sions reflect Swiss hostility toward foreign governments' efforts to en-
force their judicial processes within Switzerland without acting in coop-
eration with the Swiss government.' 3
1. Swiss Penal Code Article 271
Article 271 forbids a Swiss citizen from acting in cooperation with a
foreign state without authorization from the Swiss government.' 4 In
client) and In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bowe), 694 F. 2d 1256, 1258 (11 th Cir.
1982) (requiring no minimum showing of relevance when ordering production of attor-
ney's records presumptively relevant to investigation) and In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (lth Cir. 1982) (requiring no
minimum showing of relevance of customer bank records to a tax and narcotics investi-
gation), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
11. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (International Paper Co.), 72 F.
Supp. 1013, 1020 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (stating that "[tihe test is control-not location");
see also In re Investigation of World Arrangements (Oil Cartel Case), 13 F.R.D. 280,
285 (D.D.C. 1952):
[I]f a corporation has power, either directly or indirectly, through another corpo-
ration or a series of corporations, to elect a majority of the directors of another
corporation, such corporation may be deemed a parent corporation and in control
of the corporation whose directors it has power to elect to office. If any corpora-
tion herein under the subpoena duces tecum has that power it has control neces-
sary to secure the documents demanded by the government.
Id. at 285.
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982) (failing to obey court orders is contempt, punisha-
ble by fine or imprisonment); 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1982) (refusing to testify or pro-
vide information to the grand jury, without cause, is punishable by confinement). See
generally Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power, supra note 4, at 1470 (dis-
cussing contempt proceedings for failing to obey a grand jury order).
13. Brief for the Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae at 21, Marc Rich
& Co., A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Brief for
the Government of Switzerland]
14. STGB, CP, Cp, art. 271 (Switz. 1976). Article 271 states in pertinent part:
Acting without Authorization for a Foreign State.
(1) Whoever performs, without permission, acts for a foreign state on Swiss ter-
ritory which are within the authority of an administrative agency or a public
official,




practice, this article prohibits attorneys or foreign officials from taking
evidence on Swiss territory 15 and prohibits direct service of documents
by mail or through Swiss lawyers.1" The government of Switzerland
maintains that article 271 restricts actions within Switzerland to carry
out the demands of a foreign subpoena.17
2. Swiss Penal Code Article 273
Article 273 prohibits exploring or making accessible a manufactur-
ing or business secret on behalf of a foreign authority.' According to
the government of Switzerland, the purpose of article 273 is to protect
Swiss sovereignty and the privacy of its citizens.'9 The government of
Switzerland defines the term "manufacturing or business secret" as
covering all aspects of business life that: (1) are neither commonly
known nor generally accessible; (2) the interested person desires to
keep secret; and (3) which an objective interest exists in keeping se-
cret.20 Article 273 is part of the chapter of the Swiss Penal Code relat-
ing to crimes against the state and national defense.21 Because it con-
stitutes an "ex officio" offense, this law requires the Swiss government
to enforce it whenever evidence of a violation appears, even absent an
Whoever performs such acts, will be punished by imprisonment, in grave cases
by confinement in a penitentiary.
Id.
15. Brief for the Government of Switzerland, supra note 13, at 20. The brief added
in a footnote that "[tihe law applies even if the foreign nation asserts jurisdiction over
the party controlling the evidence in Switzerland." Id. at 20, n.5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. STGB, Cp, Cp, art. 273 (Switz. 1976). Article 273 provides:
Whoever explores a manufacturing or business secret in order to make it acces-
sible to a foreign authority or a foreign organization or a foreign private business
enterprise or their agents,
Whoever makes a manufacturing or business secret accessible to a foreign au-
thority or a foreign organization or a foreign private business enterprise or their
agents,
Shall be punished with imprisonment, in serious cases with penitentiary confine-
ment. The deprivation of liberty can be combined with a fine.
Id.
19. Brief for the Government of Switzerland, supra note 13, at 20.
20. Id. at 21. In United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981), the
court stated that the term business secret includes "all facts of business life to the
extent that they are worthy of protection in keeping them confidential." Id. at 1329
(quoting Swiss Federal Attorney V.A. Judgment of Sept. 7, 1972, 98 BGE IV 209, 210
Switz.). See generally Note, Subpoena of Documents Located in Foreign Jurisdictions
Where Law of Situs Prohibits Removal, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 295, 296-98 (1962) [here-
inafter Note, Subpoena of Documents] (discussing classification of statutes relied on as
justification for noncompliance with a subpoena).
21. Brief for the Government of Switzerland, supra note 13, at 21.
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injured party's complaint.22
3. Swiss Constitution Article 102
Article 102 of the Swiss Constitution defines the Federal Council's 23
powers and obligations. According to article 102, section 8, the Federal
Council must safeguard the interests of Switzerland in dealings with
foreign countries. 24 Specifically, the Council handles Switzerland's for-
eign affairs and relations under international law. 5
4. Swiss Penal Code Article 292
Article 292 of the Swiss Penal Code makes failure to obey the Swiss
government's orders a criminal act.26 Therefore, a Swiss citizen's com-
pliance with a United States grand jury subpoena that involves taking
evidence within Switzerland may result in criminal sanctions against
the party-litigant.27 Consequently, a Catch-22 arises as compliance
with an American grand jury subpoena constitutes a criminal act in
Switzerland and noncompliance with a subpoena subjects a party to
criminal penalties in the United States.
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW APPROACHES
TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE POWERS OF THE
GRAND JURY AND SWISS NONDISCLOSURE LAWS
Customary international law28 provides three basic principles rele-
vant to conflicts between a court's discovery orders2" and foreign non-
22. Id.
23. BV. CST, COST. FED., art. 102. Article 102, section 8 of the Swiss Constitution
provides in part:
"The Federal Council within the limits established by the present Constitution
has primarily the following powers and obligations:
8. It shall safeguard the interests of the Confederation in dealing with foreign
countries, specifically its relations under international law, and it shall handle




26. STGB, Cp, Cp, art. 292 (Switz. 1976). Article 292 provides: "[w]hoever diso-
beys orders that are addressed to him by a competent authority or official with a notice
regarding the penal consequences of this article, shall be confined by jail or fined." Id.
27. Brief for the Government of Switzerland, supra note 13, at 22.
28. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 102 (2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). The Restatement provides: "[c]ustomary
international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by
them from a sense of legal obligation." Id.
29. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 34 (concerning discovery in civil litigation).
[VOL. 2:229234
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disclosure laws.3" Lex fori3 a stands for the principle that the domestic
forum controls its own legal procedures. 32 International comity3 holds
that domestic courts should not take action that may cause the viola-
tion of another country's laws.34 State sovereignty35 maintains that a
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) allows for the discovery of any nonprivileged information
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. FED. R.
Civ. P. 34(a) requires the compliance with a subpoena for records or documents that
are in the "possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is
served." Id.
Compared with discovery in criminal matters, discovery in civil litigations is much
broader. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (detailing grand jury subpoena procedure in criminal
discovery).
30. See Comment, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in
Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L. J. 612, 613-15 (1979) [hereinafter Comment, Foreign
Nondisclosure Law] (discussing the policy conflict between two of the three basic prin-
ciples, lex fori and international comity). A foreign nondisclosure law is not a valid
reason for noncompliance with a discovery order. In re Investigation of World Arrange-
ments (Oil Cartel Case), 13 F.R.D. 280, 285 (D.D.C. 1952) (requiring American par-
ent company to produce documents in possession of foreign subsidiary).
31. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 819 (5th ed. 1979) (defining lexfori as the law of
the situs country). Lexfori, or law of the jurisdiction in which relief is sought, controls
for all matters pertaining to procedural rights. Id.
32. See Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 445 (D.D.C.
1953), modified sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Brownwell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.
1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197
(1958). "The court cannot accept the dictates of any municipal law other than its own
as to what discovery ought or ought not be insisted upon either generally or in any
particular case." Id. (quoting the Baron Stjern (British Prize Cases), App. Cas. 173,
178 (1918)).
33. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3d Cir. 1971) (discussing the meaning of international comity), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 (1972). The Third Circuit stated that international comity is "recognition which
one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts
of another [nation] . . . .[I]t is a nation's expression of understanding which demon-
strates due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
persons protected by its own laws." Id.
34. See Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or "There and Back Again,"
25 VA. J. INT'L L. 7, 13-16 (1984) (discussing the importance that each nation give its
respect to the laws, policies, and interests of others that it would have others give to its
own laws in the same or similar circumstances); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (Boston 1834) (commenting that a nation should not make its
own jurisprudence an "instrument of injustice" to other nations); see also Comment,
Ordering Production of Documents from Abroad in Violation of Foreign Law, 31 U.
CI. L. REV. 791, 794-97 (1964) [hereinafter Comment, Ordering Production] (dis-
cussing international comity and the production of evidence).
35. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed by itself. Any restric-
tion upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution
of its sovereignty, to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sov-
ereignty, to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
Id. See generally Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REv. 241
(1923) (commenting on the limits of a sovereign's jurisdictional claims).
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state may not exercise its power in any form within the territory of
another state."6
A. LEX FORI
The basic principle underlying lex fori is the impropriety of allowing
a foreign entity to invoke its own laws and procedures because this en-
ables the nonforum state to circumvent the forum state's laws and
place itself in a better position. 7 Courts have maintained that "[e]ven
if a foreign government were itself a party, it must conform to the laws
of the forum and make discovery upon order of the court."38
The inflexibility of lex fori resulted in limited use.39 Courts held that
this principle generally fails to consider the sovereign rights of the for-
eign state40 such as those of Switzerland in the United States grand
jury power-Swiss nondisclosure law conflict."1
B. INTERNATIONAL COMITY
The principle of international comity reflects a broader policy con-
cern that each member of the international community should "do jus-
tice [so] that justice may be done in return. ' 2 Its broader perspective
made international comity more widely accepted than lex fori.4' The
36. See S. S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (modifying
principle of state sovereignty). "[A]I1 that can be required of a state is that it should
not overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these
limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty." Id.; see generally Juris-
diction with Respect to Crime Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 435, 445 (1935) (listing five basic principles used to determine the
existence of jurisdiction).
37. See Dixon's Executors v. Ramsay, 5 U.S. (3 Cranch) 319, 324 (1806). "No
man can sue in the courts of any country, whatever his rights may be, unless in con-
formity with the rules prescribed by the laws of that country." Id.
38. Id. Rothschild v. Queen of Portugal, 3 Y. & C. 594, 160 Eng. Rep. 838 (Exch.,
1839); Republic of Haiti v. Plesch, 19 Misc. 219, 88 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1949).
39. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (eschewing reliance
on the lex fori principle).
40. Federal Maritime Commission v. DeSmedt, 268 F. Supp. 972, 974-75
(S.D.N.Y. 1967). Judge Ryan remonstrated that "I cannot, of course, direct and order
anybody to violate the orders of his native land and I don't intend to do so, and I don't
intend the United States court to be so presumptuous as to attempt to intrude upon the
sovereignty of any foreign nation." Id.
41. See Comment, International Paper Chase, supra note 3, at 160 (applying the
lex fori principle precludes a court from considering the foreign state's interests in
addition to those of the United States).
42. Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Law, supra note 30 at 614 n.13 (quoting Russian
Socialist Federated Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259, 260
(1923)).
43. Cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (constituting the first American case
to recognize the international comity principle). In 1980 Robert B. Owen, Office of
[VOL. 2:229
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Second Circuit, for example, regularly applies international comity to
quash subpoenas issued for the production of business records."
The principle of international comity, however, is also ineffective
when applied to the United States-Swiss disclosure conflict.4 5 Courts
apply the comity principle in so many different contexts that it is no
longer considered a viable concept.46 Various interpretations conclude
that comity stands for: (1) a forum's courtesy in recognizing the for-
eign law;47 (2) a foreign law's incorporation into the legal system ap-
plying it;48 and, (3) friendly nations' reciprocal recognition of each
other's laws.49 United States courts appear to accept the reciprocal the-
ory as the most plausible definition of comity. 0 Implicit in this defini-
tion, however, is the belief that international comity allows foreign de-
Legal Advisor of the United States Department of State, wrote concerning In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litigation (Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.), 617 F.2d
1248 (7th Cir. 1980) that "in future proceedings and this and other cases, the courts
should give due consideration to the views of interested foreign governments and take
into account appropriate considerations of comity where there is possible conflict be-
tween the laws or policies of national states." Leich, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 76 Ai. J. INrL L. 836, 845 (1982).
44. See, e.g., In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962)
(modifying a subpoena duces tecum directing a bank to produce records of its Panama-
nian branch because of an obligation to respect the laws of sovereign states); Ings v.
Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152-53 (2d Cir. 1960) (quashing subpoena of records located
in Canada because of the possibility that compliance would have required violation of
Canadian laws); First Natl City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959) (hold-
ig that proof of a violation of Panamanian law would have allowed the subpoena to be
vacated), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960). The court in Ings took the position that
"upon fundamental principles of international comity, our courts dedicated to the en-
forcement of our laws, should not take such actions as may cause a violation of the
laws of a friendly neighbor or, at least an unnecessary circumvention of its proce-
dures." Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960).
45. See Comment, Ordering Production, supra note 34, at 794-97 (discussing inad-
equacies in the international comity principle).
46. Id.; cf. Hanzard, U.S. Antitrust Process Beyond Our Borders: Jurisdiction and
Comity, NEW YORK BAR ASS'N, SECTION ON ANTITRUST LAW, Symposium 44, 47-50
(1953) (summarizing various attempts to define comity).
47. Comment, Ordering Production, supra note 34, at 795.
48. Id. (citing R. LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS OF THE QUESTION WHICH ARISE
FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS
(1828)).
49. Comment, Ordering Production, supra note 34, at 795 n.18 (citing J. STORY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35). But cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895) (not-
ing that while international law is founded on mutuality and reciprocity, a judgment
entered in a foreign country, and therefore based on foreign law, is not entitled to full
credit or to be deemed conclusive when sued on in the United States).
50. See Comment, Ordering Production, supra note 34, at 795 (maintaining that
United States courts generally follow the reciprocal theory of international comity).
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT LAWS § 98 comment (e) (1971) (main-
taining that reciprocity requirements for the enforcement of foreign judgments are gen-
erally disfavored today).
19871
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fendants to take unjust advantage of their nondisclosure laws. 1
Moreover, this theory fails to respect adequately the forum state's in-
terest in procuring information necessary to properly adjudicate a
conflict. 2
International comity has proven as ineffective as the principle of lex
fori.53 Applied to the subpoena-nondisclosure law conflict, the United
States has a limited ability to procure the requested documents. In def-
erence to Swiss nondisclosure laws, United States courts might be un-
willing to enforce a grand jury subpoena.
C. STATE SOVEREIGNTY
State sovereignty is based on the premise that a state must exclu-
sively control its territory in order to protect it.54 Moreover, customary
international law prohibits a state from interfering with another state's
sovereignty.55 Based on the state sovereignty principle, if a United
States grand jury issued a subpoena requiring a Swiss corporation to
violate Swiss laws, the Swiss government could claim that the subpoena
infringed on its sovereign rights and thus violated customary interna-
tional law."' Accordingly, a United States court could quash the sub-
poena and deprive a United States grand jury of the requested
information.
The state sovereignty principle is now diluted. Most authorities now
51. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208 (1958) (advocating the
use of a good faith test to determine whether a defendant is unjustly taking advantage
of foreign nondisclosure laws). The good faith test was put forth in response to the
perception that comity enabled a party to place itself in a more favorable position be-
cause of foreign laws. Id.
52. Comment, Ordering Production, supra note 34, at 796; see also The Island of
Palmas Case (Neth. v. U. S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 839 (1928) (acknowledging
that a sine qua non of statehood controls acts or things located in a state's territory).
53. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900) (sug-
gesting "[c]omity persuades; but it does not command"). International comity is inef-
fective, because it allows a United States court to order an action that may cause the
violation of foreign laws. Id.
54. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824), quoted in Onkelinx, Con-
flict of International Jurisdiction: Ordering the Production of Documents in Violation
of the Law of the Situs, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 487, 490 (1969). "The laws of [a] nation
: * . can have no force to control the sovereignty or rights of any other nation, within
its own jurisdiction." Id.
55. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (stating
"[t]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that
. . . it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State").
56. See Note, International Paper Chase, supra note 3, at 161 n.63. (maintaining
that a "domestic judicial order compelling a party to produce documents in contraven-
tion of another sovereign's nondisclosure laws may constitute a violation of customary
international law").
57. See Onkelinx, supra note 54, at 490 (observing that territorial jurisdiction is no
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recognize a state's right to exercise jurisdiction over threatening con-
duct occurring outside its territory."' Like the principle of international
comity,59 however, state sovereignty prohibits a court from properly ad-
judicating international claims.60
The recent dilution of the state sovereignty principle rendered it in-
applicable to the problem of a grand jury's power to subpoena foreign-
based documents. 61 If the grand jury claimed that the illegal activity
had an impact in the United States, then in subpoenaing business
records a grand jury would not exceed the customary international law
limits placed on its jurisdiction. 2 It appears, therefore, that the state
sovereignty principle is equally ineffective in trying to reconcile the
power of a United States grand jury with the limits of the Swiss non-
disclosure laws.6" Similar to the other customary international law ap-
proaches, state sovereignty is incapable of solving the "Catch-22" be-
cause it favors one country over another. When a basic conflict of
rights exists between two countries, resorting to favoritism is not a
proper solution.
III. RECENT JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE
BROAD POWERS OF THE UNITED STATES GRAND JURY
WITH RESTRICTIVE SWISS LAW
Two recent federal circuit court cases illustrate the need for a new
solution to the United States-Swiss conflict. In both cases, the courts
longer absolute); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing earlier no-
tions that territorial jurisdiction has no limitation).
58. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 404 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). In the United States, the right to exercise
jurisdiction over external conduct threatening domestic harm is also known as the "ef-
fects test." United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945)(Hand, J.).
59. See supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text (discussing application of the
principle of international comity to the United States-Switzerland conflict).
60. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (commenting that state sovereignty
restricts a court's power over people and property in foreign jurisdictions).
61. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945) (noting that "[ult is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even
upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends"). Based on Judge Hand's effects
test, a grand jury could still subpoena certain foreign-based records. Id.
62. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the modification of the
sovereignty principle in Lotus that allows the courts to exercise jurisdiction within cer-
tain limits).
63. See Onkelinx, supra note 54, at 494 (observing that traditional methods used to
solve an international conflict are inadequate because they cannot "cope with problems
arising out of an increasingly interdependent world") (citing Carlston, Antitrust Policy
Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 569, 581 (1954)).
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struggled to balance the competing interests of the American grand
jury and the government of Switzerland. Moreover, the decisions high-
light the "Catch-22" the Swiss corporate defendants presently face.
A. UNITED STATES V. VETCO
In United States v. Vetco,64 the Ninth Circuit considered the issu-
ance of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summonses to Vetco, Inc.
(Vetco) and its accountants, Deloitte, Haskins & Sells (DH&S).6 5 The
summonses ordered the parties to produce books and records of Vetco's
foreign subsidiaries, including Vetco's Swiss subsidiary, Vetco Interna-
tional, A.G. (VIAG). 86 Upon failure to comply, the IRS filed an action
in federal district court to enforce the summonses. 67 The district court
ordered Vetco and DH&S to produce the requested records,68 and on
their refusal to comply, imposed a $500 per day fine until Vetco and
DH&S produced the documents.69
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Vetco and DH&S claimed possible
Swiss penalties for violating article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code 0 ex-
cused them from complying with the summonses.7 1 Vetco and DH&S
also argued the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of article
273 in Societe Internationale v. Rogers2 supported their claim.73
64. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981) (amending techni-
cal changes and republished at 691 F.2d 1281). Because the technical changes in the
decision are not relevant to this Comment, all citations to Vetco will refer to its first
publication.
65. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir. 1981).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1327.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (providing the pertinent part of arti-
cle 273 of the Swiss Penal Code).
71. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In Societe Internatio-
nale, a Swiss company sued to recover property confiscated by the United States gov-
ernment during World War II. Id. at 198-200. The United States requested discovery
of a Swiss banking firm's records that allegedly conspired with the plaintiff. Id. at 199.
The Swiss government enjoined the plaintiff from producing the requested documents.
Id. at 200. The United States district court dismissed the action when the plaintiff
failed to produce the documents. Id. at 202. The Supreme Court, however, held that
the district court could not dismiss a plaintiff's complaint for failure to comply with a
discovery request when the plaintiff made good faith efforts to comply. Id. at 207-08,
12; see United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981) (recounting
the decision in Societe Internationale).
73. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981). The court in
Societe Internationale stated that: "[f]ear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty
excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing
compliance are those of a foreign sovereign." 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958), quoted in
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The court in Vetco, however, distinguished both the holding and the
facts of Societe Internationale.7 4 The court stated that the holding in
Societe Internationale did not erect an absolute bar to summons en-
forcement and contempt sanctions whenever foreign law prohibits com-
pliance with a United States grand jury summons.75 Rather, the court
in Vetco agreed with the Supreme Court's ultimate conclusion in So-
ciete Internationale that enforcement of a summons depends "upon the
circumstances of a given case. ' 6
Concerning the facts in Societe Internationale, the court in Vetco
acknowledged that the plaintiff in Societe Internationale made an ex-
tensive good faith effort to comply with the discovery request, but the
Swiss government frustrated those efforts.7" In contrast, the Vetco
court held Vetco and DH&S did not make a good faith effort to com-
ply with the summonses. 79 In addition, the Swiss government did not
act to impede the party's cooperation as it had in Societe Internatio-
nale.80 The court in Vetco further distinguished Societe Internationale
because that case involved a civil discovery order, whereas Vetco in-
volved IRS summonses issued pursuant to a potential criminal investi-
gation and, the court held that, criminal summonses served a more
pressing national function than civil discovery.81
The court in Vetco ruled out a per se exemption from compliance
with a summons. 82 Instead, the court applied a balancing test to deter-
mine the circumstances under which foreign criminal liability served as
United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981). The court in Societe
Internationale added, however, that its ruling would not apply "to every situation
where a party is restricted by law from producing documents over which it is otherwise
shown to have control." Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 187, 205-06, quoted
in United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981).
74. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). "This case is
not controlled by Societe Internationale." Id.
75. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981). The court in
Vetco noted the Supreme Court's intention that its Societe Internationale ruling not
apply "to every situation where a party is restricted by law from producing documents
over which it is otherwise shown to have control" Id. at 1329 (quoting Societe Interna-
tionale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 205-06 (1958)).
76. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1329 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Societe International v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 206 (1958)).
77. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981). In Societe
Internationale, the Master found that ". . . the plaintiff. . . has shown good faith in
its efforts [to comply with the production order]". Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 201 (1958).
78. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 200 (1958).
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a valid defense to enforcement of the summonses. 83 The court consid-
ered five factors: (1) the vital national interests of each state; (2) the
extent of the hardship inconsistent enforcement imposed; (3) the loca-
tion of the documents, the nationality of the affected party and the
expectation of compliance; (4) the importance of the documents; and
(5) the availability of alternative means of compliance.84
Focusing on the first factor of its balancing test, the Ninth Circuit
found that the United States had a strong interest in collecting revenue
and prosecuting tax fraud.85 The court conceded Switzerland's interest
in preserving the secrecy of business records but determined that this
interest was diminished when it involved subsidiaries of United States
firms.88 Further, the court held that article 273 of the Swiss Penal
83. Id. at 1330-31. The court in Vetco derived the "balancing test" from the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965), that provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and
the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a per-
son, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moder-
ating the exercise of the enforcement jurisdiction in light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Id.
Section 40 of the Restatement had received judicial approval before the decision in
Vetco. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d
992, 997 (10th Cir. 1977) (balancing Canada's interest in protecting information about
nuclear energy located in that country against the United States interest in civil discov-
ery in a price fixing action); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field),
432 F.2d 404, 407 n.2 (5th Cir.) (balancing Cayman Islands interest in bank secrecy
against the United States interest in preventing tax evasion), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940
(1976); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968)
(balancing German bank secrecy laws invoked as a defense and the United States in-
terest in unfettered discovery in an antitrust action); see also Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (reviewing the use of the bal-
ancing test in antitrust litigation discovery); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976) (balancing relevant consid-
erations rather than bestowing complete immunity on all conduct with same imprima-
tur of a foreign government under the Act of State doctrine).
84. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330-33 (9th Cir. 1981).
85. Id. at 1331. The court held that the United States interest in prosecuting fraud
committed by United States nationals operating through foreign subsidiaries was simi-
lar to Switzerland's interest with respect to the activities of its own nationals. Id.
86. Id. The court emphasized that: (1) Swiss criminal law was only intended to
reach situations in which a Swiss party objected to revealing the requested information;
and (2) Switzerland's secrecy interest was reduced by the requirement that the IRS
maintain the confidentiality of the documents. Id.; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v.
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Code did not impose a great hardship on Vetco or DH&S. 7
Thereafter, the court in Vetco examined the remaining criteria of the
balancing test and determined that they also weighed in favor of re-
quiring compliance with grand jury subpoenas. 8 First, the court held
that although the documents were located in Switzerland, activities re-
lated to their production would take place in both Switzerland and the
United States.89 Second, although VIAG was a Swiss concern, it was a
controlled subsidiary of a United States corporation. 0 Third, the court
considered the importance of the documents to the requesting party
and held that the IRS sufficiently demonstrated the relevance of the
records to its investigations.91 Fourth, the court considered alternate
means of acquiring the requested information and found that no ade-
quate substitute existed.92 Ultimately,93 the court held that the United
Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting that foreign
governments were more concerned with their own nationals than with United States
businesses doing business within their territories).
87. Id. at 1331-32. A representative of the Swiss Federal Attorney submitted an
affidavit stating enforcement of an IRS summons might constitute duress and hence
serve as a defense against possible criminal charges in Switzerland. Id. at 1332. In
addition, the court in Vetco noted that this dilemma could have been avoided if Vetco
had kept certain records required by United States law. See id. (acknowledging that
the Internal Revenue Code requires United States companies to maintain records of
foreign subsidiaries to the extent necessary to determine whether tax on subpart F
income is due).




92. Id. at 1332-33; see SEC v. Minas de Artemisa, S.A., 150 F.2d 215, 218-19
(9th Cir. 1945) (holding that a court will consider alternate means of obtaining docu-
ments where compliance with a Securities and Exchange Commission subpoena would
violate Mexican law).
The court addressed each alternative the Appellants suggested. United States v.
Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1981). Vetco and DH&S could have
sought consent to disclose from interested third parties, but such a procedure would
have limited the information received and would have been time-consuming and costly.
Id. at 1324, 1332. The court examined the possibility of using letters rogatory, but
noted that Switzerland had previously refused to provide information to a United
States tax fraud investigation when that information was not available under the Con-
vention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, May 24 - Sept. 27, 1951, 2 U.S.T.,
T.I.A.S. No.2316, 127 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter "Tax Convention"]. Id. at 1333; see
X & Y Bank v. Swiss Federal Tax Administration, Judgment of May 16, 1975,
Bundegericht 101 BGE 1 160, 76-1 U.S.T.C. § 9452, at 84, 213-84 (ruling by Swiss
Federal Supreme Court that the Convention does not require Switzerland to transmit
all information required under United States law); see also Tax Convention, art. VI,
which reads, in pertinent part, "[n]o information shall be exchanged which would dis-
close any trade, business, industrial or professional secrets or any trade process.'; cf.
STGB, CP, Cp, art. 274 (Switz. 1976) (containing language similar to that of article
VI of the Convention).
Next, the court determined that masking the names of interested third parties would
not be appropriate because information about such parties was relevant to a subpart F
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States had a powerful interest in obtaining the summoned documents
and that Switzerland had only a slight interest in nondisclosure.94 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that Vetco and DH&S must comply with the
IRS summonses. 5
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Vetco follows a trend away from rou-
tine deferral to foreign law based on principles of international com-
ity.98 Instead, the holding in Vetco balances the competing interests of
affected states.97 Federal court decisions following Vetco predominately
hold that the interests of justice associated with United States grand
jury investigations outweigh foreign countries' prohibitions against dis-
investigation. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981). Fi-
nally, in response to the appellant's suggestion that the IRS examine the requested
records in Switzerland, the court observed that such action would subject IRS agents to
criminal liability under article 271 of the Swiss Penal Code. Id. In contrast, requiring
Vetco and DH&S to produce the records would subject them to liability under article
273 only if interested third parties objected to the disclosure and a Swiss court denied
the defense of duress. Id.; see supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing
articles 271 and 273 of the Swiss Penal Code).
93. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition
to the foreign illegality and Convention defenses, the court considered appellants' con-
tention that the district court erred in that it failed to enter findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, and that the district court's production order denied DH&S due process.
Id. The court treated these additional issues as questions of procedure and resolved
them against Vetco and DH&S. Id.
94. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that
the United States interest in enforcing the subpoena outweighs the contrary Swiss
interest).
95. Id.
96. See supra notes 36, 57-58 and accompanying text (observing the trend away
from routine deferral to international concern).
97. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330-31 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting
a balancing test to resolve dispute); see supra note 83 and accompanying text (provid-
ing the text of the balancing test the Ninth Circuit adopted in Vetco); cf. Trade and
Development Bank v. Continental Insurance Co., 469 F.2d 35, 40-42 (2d Cir. 1972)
(holding that district court, after balancing competing interests, did not abuse its dis-
cretion in refusing to order production of documents located in Swiss banks). See gen-
erally Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation:
Recent Developments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Non-
Production, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 747, 748, 752-56 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Discovery
of Documents Located Abroad] (discussing application of the balancing test in various
contexts).
In Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) and In re Chase Manhattan Bank,
297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962), cases in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the principle of international comity to deny discovery requests, the persons to
whom summonses were issued were not parties to the actions and alternate means to
obtain the requested information were present. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Vetco recognized these factors as significant. United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d
1324, 1330-31 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981). The court in Vetco neither ignored nor rejected the
argument for applying principles of comity, but chose to distinguish the facts before it




closure.98 Swiss authorities, however, are unlikely to accept a balancing
test that overwhelmingly favors the United States."" Consequently, an
alternative that satisfies both Swiss and United States interests must
include an authoritative body not having to balance the competing in-
terests of the United States and Switzerland. A treaty requiring entities
to keep business records in each forum provides an acceptable
alternative.
B. MARC RICH & Co., A.G. V. UNITED STATES
In Marc Rich and Co. v. United States,100 Marc Rich and Co.
(Marc Rich), the Swiss parent company of its wholly-owned American
subsidiary, Marc Rich and Co. International Ltd., raised the applica-
bility of article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code. 101 The grand jury, investi-
gating an alleged tax evasion scheme involving the Swiss company and
its American subsidiary,10 2 subpoenaed Marc Rich to produce docu-
ments concerning certain oil transactions.0 3 Marc Rich moved to
quash the subpoena on the grounds, inter alia, that article 273 of the
Swiss Penal Code prohibited the production of the material de-
manded.'" The district court denied the motion to quash the sub-
98. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia (I), 740 F.2d 817,
828 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (holding interests of grand jury outweigh bank secrecy interest of
Cayman Islands); In re Grand Jury Proceedings Bank of Nova Scotia (II), 691 F.2d
1384, 1390-91 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (finding interest of grand jury outweighs bank secrecy
interest of Bahamas); United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp.
1080, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting interest of United States in collection of taxes
outweighs Hong Kong's interest in refusing to release documents); SEC v. Banca Della
Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 117-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding United States vital
national interest in preserving integrity of securities markets outweighs Swiss interest
in nondisclosure law). But see United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d
341, 345-47 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that Greek bank secrecy law outweighed IRS
interest in enforcing summons).
99. See infra notes 100-26, and accompanying text (indicating that the Swiss gov-
ernment is likely to take stricter measures where a Swiss national is concerned). Com-
pare Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.) (involving a
Swiss national where Switzerland seized the subpoenaed documents), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983), with United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981)
(involving a Swiss subsidiary of American company where Switzerland released the
records).
100. Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
101. Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (providing pertinent provisions
of article 273 of Swiss Penal Code).
102. Id. at 665.
103. Id. The subpoena called for various business records relating to the Swiss cor-
poration's crude oil transactions in 1980 and 1981. Id.
104. Id. Marc Rich also moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds that it was
not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. Id. The jurisdiction of the court
over a foreign defendant is beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Note, The
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poena' 05 holding Swiss law did not bar the production of the docu-
ments. 108 The district court held Marc Rich in civil contempt'0 7 and
fined the company $50,000 per day until it turned over the docu-
ments.108 The Second Circuit affirmed the contempt decision109 but
failed to address the relevance of article 273 of the Swiss Penal
Code." 0
Swiss authorities, despite the $50,000 per day fine, ordered Marc
Rich not to comply with the subpoena and, on three separate occasions,
seized various documents the subpoena demanded."' In response, Marc
Rich again moved to vacate the judgments of contempt on grounds that
Marc Rich Case: Extension of the Grand Jury Subpoena Power to Nonresident Alien
Corporations, 18 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. AND ECON. 97, 109-11 (1984) [hereinafter
Note, The Marc Rich Case] (reviewing the applicable jurisdictional principles, chiefly
prescriptive jurisdiction).
In support of its argument to quash the subpoena, Marc Rich submitted the affidavit
of Dr. Peter B. Forstmoser. Comment, International Paper Chase, supra note 3, at 154
n.22. In his affidavit, Dr. Forstmoser stated that delivery of the documents to American
authorities would violate article 273. Id.; see also Marc Rich Penalty is Continued,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983, at D2, col. 3 (noting that Switzerland had requested that
the district court stay sanctions against Marc Rich pending a bilateral attempt to settle
the issue of production of documents); infra note 111 and accompanying text (detailing
the Swiss government's actions after the federal court upheld the subpoena).
105. Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 665 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
106. Id. Judge Sand also refused to quash the subpoena because personal jurisdic-
tion existed over Marc Rich. Id.
107. Id. But cf. Note, Limitations on the Federal Judicial Power, supra note 4, at
1470 (stating that "it is clear that a person cannot be held in criminal or civil contempt
for noncompliance [with a subpoena] owing to physical impossibility").
108. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 665, 670 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983). Execution of the contempt order was stayed, how-
ever, pending appeal of the district court's decision. Id.
109. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States, 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir. 1984).
After the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Sand's contempt decision, Marc Rich moved
to vacate the order on the grounds that Swiss court orders prohibited compliance. Id.
The motion was denied and Marc Rich appealed. Id. Shortly thereafter, in August
1983, Marc Rich agreed to comply with the subpoena and not raise Swiss law as a
reason for non-production of the documents. Id. Marc Rich's agreement not to raise
the issue of the relevance of Swiss law became part of the court's order in dismissing
the appeal. Id.
110. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (I), 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983); see also Comment, International Paper Chase, supra
note 3, at 162 (stating that "although Marc Rich's arguments on appeal centered prin-
cipally on issues of personal jurisdiction, the court of appeals should have considered
the competing states' national interests before exercising enforcement jurisdiction over
the Swiss corporation").
111. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir.
1984); see Marc Rich, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1983 at D2, col. 3. Because the Swiss
government perceived that the United States had affronted international law, Switzer-
land's national sovereignty, and Swiss secrecy laws, the Swiss government seized some




the Swiss government prohibited compliance with the subpoena. " 2
During the hearing on Marc Rich's motion, the government of Switzer-
land appeared before the Second Circuit as amicus curiae on behalf of
Marc Rich.11 The Swiss government contended that: (1) a clear con-
flict existed between the public laws of Switzerland and those of the
United States; and, (2) United States efforts to force compliance with
the subpoena violated Swiss sovereignty and international comity.124
The government of Switzerland maintained, however, that the United
States could obtain the documents if it utilized diplomatic procedures
established in the United States-Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters (1977).11
5
The Second Circuit, however, failed to address the Swiss govern-
ment's concerns.116 Once again, the court rejected Marc Rich's motions
to vacate the contempt order.117 The court reasoned that: (1) Marc
Rich never produced appropriate affidavits attesting to the impossibility
of compliance with the subpoena; 1 8 (2) Marc Rich agreed in August,
1983, not to raise Swiss law as a reason for noncompliance with the
subpoena;" 9 and (3) res judicata barred consideration of Swiss law
112. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir.
1984).
113. Id.
114. Id; see supra notes 6-27 and accompanying text (discussing broad powers of
the United States grand jury and Swiss nondisclosure laws); see supra notes 42-63 and
accompanying text (stating theories of international comity and state sovereignty).
115. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir.
1984). Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United
States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 [hereinafter "Criminal Assis-
tance Treaty"]; see infra notes 132-66 and accompanying text (discussing the Criminal
Assistance Treaty).
116. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864, 866 (2d Cir.
1984). One explanation for the Second Circuit's disregard for the Swiss government's
concern is the court's earlier ruling that it has jurisdiction over a person who causes
adverse consequences within a state. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (I),
707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983). The earlier decision
concluded that when the United States is adversely affected by the "wrongful evasion
of its revenue laws," the offense itself supports jurisdiction. Id. at 667-68.
117. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v United States (II), 736 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir.
1984).
118. Id. The Second Circuit maintained that if the Swiss government's seizures had
made further compliance impossible, Marc Rich could assert the impossibility defense
as a reason for noncompliance. Id.
The doctrine of impossibility holds that a person cannot be held in criminal or civil
contempt for noncompliance owing to physical impossibility. See Kempson v. Kempson,
1 N.J.Eq. 303, 48 A. 244 (Ch. 1901) (applying the impossibility doctrine to contempt
order); Butcher v Coats, 1 U.S. (1Dall.) 304 (Pa. 1788) (same).
119. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing Marc Rich's agree-
ment not to raise Swiss law).
19871
248 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 2:229
and orders not raised on the first appeal. 120 Focusing on these proce-
dural defects, the Second Circuit chose not to address this complex
conflict between United States and Swiss law.121
Marc Rich is a useful example of how to reconcile the powers of the
United States grand jury inquiry with Swiss nondisclosure laws. Fur-
ther, it indicates how the Swiss government might react to a future
American grand jury attempt to obtain documents from a Swiss com-
pany within Switzerland. 122 It is important to note, however, that the
Swiss government intentionally limited its argument to the facts of
Marc Rich. 2 3 The Swiss government may act differently if faced with
120. Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cir.
1984). "Since Rich has had numerous opportunities to bring this issue [Swiss law] to
the court of appeals and has not done so, the principle of res judicata bars it from
doing so now." Id.
121. Id. On October 11, 1984, Marc Rich pleaded guilty to thirty-eight counts of
making false statements to federal authorities and two counts of tax evasion. See Baum
& Schmitt, Marc Rich & Co., Former Unit Plead Guilty, Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1984,
at 3, col. 1. Marc Rich agreed to pay the United States $150 million and to forfeit $21
million in fines paid pursuant to Judge Sand's contempt order. Id. at 20, col. 2. Marc
Rich also waived the right to claim the $150 million payment as tax liability in the
future. Id.
122. See Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 999, 1003 (1984) (providing two other cases that suggest the Swiss govern-
ment's possible future behavior).
In United States v. Lemire, the Justice Department sought evidence and investiga-
tive assistance from Switzerland in a matter involving a commercial fraud scheme
against the Raytheon Company. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1330 (D.C.
Cir. 1983). The defendants bribed Raytheon employees with more than one million
dollars to guarantee the awarding of shipping subcontracts for a major Raytheon air
defense project in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 1332-33. These shipping subcontracts contained
inflated charges of more than two million dollars. Id. The defendants diverted this
money to a Swiss bank account. Id. at 1332.
The Department of Justice's request for the information was filed pursuant to the
Criminal Assistance Treaty. Id. It took nearly three years before all the essential items
of evidence were obtained. Id. Moreover, the United States requests received only mini-
mal cooperation. Id.
The insider trading investigation in Banca Della Svizzera Italiana required a Swiss
corporation ("BSI") doing business for undisclosed principals on the New York Stock
Exchange to disclose the identity of the investors, notwithstanding that such disclosure
would violate Swiss nondisclosure laws. SEC v. Banca Delia Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111, 112-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). BSI refused to comply with the order, alleging as
a defense that bank secrecy laws of Switzerland barred compliance. Id. at 113.
The Swiss government, however, expressed no opposition to release of the records. Id.
at 117. In response to BSI inquiries, the Swiss Federal Attorney General said only that
a "foreign court could not change the rule that disclosure required the consent of the
one who imparted the secret that BSI might thus be subject to prosecution." Id. at
117-18. The Swiss government did not confiscate the records as it did in Marc Rich.
Id. at 118. Rather, the Swiss government did not even suggest that the United States
halt discovery. Id; see also Olsen, Discovery in Federal Criminal Investigations, 16
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999, 1016 (1984) (providing Swiss government's attitude to
United States' request for certain records in BSI).
123. Reply Brief for the Government of Switzerland at 6, Marc Rich and Co.,
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a factually distinct situation. 24
Clearly, however, the Swiss seizure of documents from Marc Rich
after both the trial and appellate court upheld the grand jury subpoena
seems extraordinary. Plausible explanations for the United States At-
torney's Office's persistence in pursuing the subpoena, rather than in
using diplomatic means, are that the United States Attorney: (1) un-
derestimated the resolve of the Swiss in enforcing their laws; (2) antici-
pated that the use of diplomatic means would be too time consuming;
or (3) believed that the available diplomatic means would not provide
assistance in a criminal tax evasion matter. At the very least, it is now
more likely that a United States Attorney's Office would first pursue
diplomatic means before resorting to a grand jury subpoena. 2 The
government of Switzerland attempted to encourage a diplomatic resolu-
tion in Marc Rich 126 and in the future, diplomatic solutions may pre-
vail. Accordingly, an examination of the applicability and utility of dip-
lomatically negotiated solutions to United States-Switzerland conflict is
essential.
A.G. v. United States (II), 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984). The Swiss government repudi-
ated United States Attorney's Office's argument that the Swiss government's position
required, in all instances, an automatic deferral to foreign prohibitions. Id. The govern-
ment of Switzerland maintained its position, that each nation attempt to minimize the
potential conflict by using the Criminal Assistance Treaty, only applied to "this case."
Id. (emphasis in original).
124. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing the alternative reac-
tions of the Swiss government in United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir.
1983); and SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. Ill (S.D.N.Y. 1981));
see also Societe Internationale v. Rogers 357 U.S. 197. 211-12 (1958) (accepting good-
faith test); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981) (declin-
ing to seize subpoenaed business records).
125. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 420(1)(c) (Tent. Draft 1982) (advising that courts pursue alternative means before
ordering the production of information located abroad); see also David H. Small, Re-
marks on "Extraterritoriality and Off Shore Subpoenas," JOINT MEETING OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW INSTITUTE AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE EXTRATERRITORIAL AP-
PLICATION OF U.S. LAW, OF THE A.B.A. SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (December 8, 1983). The United States:
[S]hould examine the possibility of developing and committing [itself to use
cooperative channels wherever they are effective and adequately prompt. I under-
stand this to be the existing policy of the Department of Justice. . .. We cannot
afford to legislate, regulate, enforce, adjudicate or negotiate without attention to
the needs of [the international] system and its public and private members.
Id.
126. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss government's
efforts to encourage the United States Attorney's Office to use diplomatic channels).
1987] 249
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
IV. NONJUDICIAL MEANS OF OBTAINING THE
DOCUMENTS
Most commentators advocate the use of diplomatic means to recon-
cile the United States-Swiss conflict. 127 The most relevant treaty be-
tween the United States and Switzerland on obtaining evidence from
within the applicable country's boarders is the Criminal Assistance
Treaty. 2 Indeed, this is the treaty the Swiss government encouraged
the United States Attorney's Office to use in Marc Rich. 2 9 A second
treaty to the obtaining of documents located abroad is the convention
for the Awardance of Double Taxation.130 Unfortunately, neither
treaty solves the "Catch-22" created when an American grand jury
subpoenas documents of a subsidiary of a Swiss corporation located in
Switzerland.1 3'
A. UNITED STATES-SWITZERLAND TREATY ON MUTUAL ASSISTANCE
IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
The Treaty between the United States and Switzerland on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters (Criminal Assistance Treaty)' 2 assists
both countries in enforcing crimes that are punishable offenses in both
127. See, e.g., Comment, International Paper Chase, supra note 3, at 168 (criticiz-
ing the decision in Marc Rich for the court's failure to consider United States treaty
obligations); Note, The Marc Rich Case, supra note 104, at 127 (supporting the use of
international treaties as the best method of resolving production disputes from coun-
tries that prohibit disclosure of business documents); Radvan, The Hague Convention
on Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters: Several Notes con-
cerning its Scope, Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1031,
1058 (1984) (advocating mandatory use of Hague Convention to obtain foreign-based
documents); Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 836-40 (1982) (citing established procedures of
intergovernmental cooperation to prevent or resolve jurisdictional conflicts).
128. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115.
129. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (providing the Swiss government's
position that the best way to obtain the requested documents is through the Criminal
Assistance Treaty).
130. Tax Convention, supra note 92.
131. This Comment only addresses those non-judicial means most relevant to the
procuring of foreign based documents. The international agreements addressed are: (1)
Treaty on Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Swit-
zerland 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S No. 8302; and, (2) Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation: Taxes on Income, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2
U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No 2316. Bilateral agreements negotiated with countries other
than Switzerland are beyond the scope of this Comment. See generally Note, Discov-
ery of Documents Located Abroad, supra note 97, at 770-74 nn. 160-70 (discussing the
use of treaties on the production of documents).
132. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115. The United States and Switzer-
land signed the treaty in Bern, Switzerland on May 25, 1973, but it did not become
legally binding until January 23, 1977. Id.
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nations. 3 Such assistance includes effecting the production of records
or articles of evidence.'" The Criminal Assistance Treaty ostensibly
accomplishes most proceedings that normally take place within the re-
questing state such as grand jury or agency investigations.' 35
Since the enactment of the Criminal Assistance Treaty in 1977,130
the United States has made more than two hundred requests for the
release of certain business records.137 These requests include orders for
disclosure of bank records,138 identification of criminal suspects, 13 and
133. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. I, para. 1(a), at 2025
(providing that the United States and Switzerland undertake mutual assistance in in-
vestigations and/or court proceedings falling within the jurisdiction of the requesting
state). The intent of the signatory states is for the Criminal Assistance Treaty to sim-
plify and expedite the procedures for obtaining information. Cf. 122 CONG. REC.
53600 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1976) (message of President Ford) (maintaining that the
presently existing procedures for obtaining information from Swiss authorities are"ponderous and inadequate").
134. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 1, para. 4(c), at 2026.
135. See generally Kenny, Structures and Methods of International and Regional
Cooperation in Penal Matters, 29 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 39, 73 (1984) (citing article 40
(2)(e) of the Criminal Assistance Treaty).
136. Since the signing of the Criminal Assistance Treaty, the United States has
concluded agreements for the exchange of information in criminal matters with the
Netherlands, Jun. 12, 1981, United States-Netherlands, T.I.AS. No. 10734 and Tur-
key, Aug. 7, 1982, United States-Turkey, T.I.A.S. No. 10619. See RESTATE?,ENT OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (REvIsED) § 484, Introductory
Note (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1984) (discussing methods in which a United States district
court may obtain evidence located in a foreign state). Various other bilateral mutual
assistance agreements the United States has signed include: Procedures for Mutual
Assistance in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Matter, April 22, 1976,
United States-Colombia, 27 U.S.T. 1059, T.I.A.S. No. 8244; Procedures for Mutual
Legal Assistance in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. Matter, March 29,
1976, United States-Italy, 27 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No. 8374; Procedures for Mutual
Assistance, Mar. 29, 1976, United States-Netherlands, 27 U.S.T. 1064, T.I.A.S. No.
8245; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Connection with McDonnell Douglass Corp.
Matters, Mar 21, 1979, United States-Netherlands, 30 U.S.T. 2500, T.I.A.S. No.
9348; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. and McDonnell Douglas Corp. Matters, July 8, 1976, United States-Turkey, 27
U.S.T. 3419, T.I.A.S. No. 8371.
137. See Crime and Secrecy: The Use of Offshore Banks and Companies, 1983:
Hearings on S. 401 Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigation of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1983) (statement of D.
Lowell Jensen, Ass't Atty. Gen., Crim Div., Justice Dept.) (discussing requests made
pursuant to Criminal Assistance Treaty).
138. See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) (requesting the
Swiss government obtain Swiss bank records of Davis for the United States); Cardenas
v. Smith, 733 F.2d. 909, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (asking the Swiss government to help
seize the Swiss bank account of a person suspected of violating American narcotic
laws).
139. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Certain Unknown Purchasers,
[1984-85 Decision] Fed. Sec. L. Rptr. (CCH) D 91,951, at 95,750 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
1985) (exemplifying when the Swiss government will relinquish documents to SEC re-
garding the identities of individuals engaged in insider trading).
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assistance from Swiss authorities in ongoing investigations. 4 Swiss
compliance with United States requests depends on: (1) adhering to
proper Criminal Assistance Treaty procedures; 141 and (2) not threaten-
ing Swiss "sovereignty, security or similar essential interest. 1 42 Swiss
140. See United States v. Johnpoll, 739 F.2d 702, 707-08 (2d Cir. 1984) (request-
ing the Swiss government's assistance in arranging telephone depositions of witnesses
for an investigation concerning stolen securities).
141. See Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 18 (detailing proce-
dures for the production of business records). Article 18 provides:
1. If the production of a document, including a book, paper, statement, record,
account or writing, or extract therefrom, other than an official document pro-
vided for in Article XIX, of whatever character and in whatever form is re-
quested, the official executing the request shall, upon specific request of the re-
questing state, require the production of such document pursuant to a procedural
document. The official shall interrogate under oath or affirmation the person pro-
ducing such document and examine it in order to determine if it is genuine and if
it was made as a memorandum or record of an act, transaction, occurrence, or
event, if it was made in the regular course of business and it was the regular
course of such business to make such document at the time of the act, transac-
tion, occurrence or event recorded therein or within a reasonable time thereafter.
2. The official shall cause a record of the testimony taken to be prepared and
shall annex it to the document.
3. If the official is satisfied as to the matters set forth in paragraph 1, he shall
certify as to the procedure followed and his determinations and shall authenti-
cate by his attestation the document, or a copy thereof or extract therefrom, and
the record of testimony taken. Such certification and attestation shall be signed
by the official and state his official position. The seal of the authority executing
the request shall be affixed.
4. Any person subsequently transmitting the authenticated document shall cer-
tify as to the genuineness of the signature and the official position of the attesting
person or, if there are any prior certifications, of the last certifying person. The
final certification may be made by:
a. an official of the Central Authority of the requested State;
b. a diplomatic or consular official of the requesting state stationed in the re-
quested State; or
c. a diplomatic or consular official of the requested State stationed in the request-
ing State.
5. Where a request under this Article pertains to a pending court proceeding, the de-
fendant, upon his application, may be present or represented by counsel or both, and
may examine the person producing the document as to its genuineness and admissibil-
ity. In the event the defendant elects to be present or represented, a representative of
the requesting State or a state or canton thereof may also be present and put such
questions to the witness.
6. Any document, copy thereof, entry therein or extract therefrom authenticated in
accordance with this Article, and not otherwise inadmissible shall be admissible as evi-
dence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event in any court in the requesting state
without any additional foundation or authentication.
7. In the event that the genuineness of any document authenticated in accordance with
this Article is denied by any party to a proceeding, he shall have the burden of estab-
lishing to the satisfaction of the court before which the proceeding is pending that such
document is not genuine in order for the document to be excluded from evidence on
such ground.
Id. at art. 18.
142. Id. at art. 3, para. l(a).
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cooperation with the United States under this treaty is predominantly
voluntary.
The extreme procedural burden placed on the requesting state under-
mines the success of the Criminal Assistance Treaty. 4 3 This burden
discourages full use of the Treaty. In United States v. Lemire,14 for
example, the request for Swiss investigative assistance was extremely
"complex and time consuming. 11145 Using the Criminal Assistance
Treaty, it took the United States Attorney's Office nearly three years to
obtain the requested evidence.1 46 Use of the Criminal Assistance
Treaty also resulted in a lengthy delay of two years in United States v.
Davis. 47 Time, therefore, is an important consideration when using the
Criminal Assistance Treaty. Attorneys are generally reluctant to resort
to a treaty to procure important documentary evidence if the Treaty
results in undue delay between the request and compliance. 4 8
The Criminal Assistance Treaty has limited applicability to various
controversies,' 49 and contains two escape clauses.10 In Marc Rich, the
government of Switzerland urged the United States to use the Criminal
Assistance Treaty to obtain subpoenaed documents.,, Although the
United States Attorney's Office ignored the Swiss government's sugges-
tion, use of the Treaty would not have resolved the conflict."0" Criminal
143. See Olsen, supra note 122, at 1003-04 (noting in United States v. Lemire, 720
F. 2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983), that the prosecutor risked running the statute of limita-
tions when Switzerland required many supplementations of his bank records request).
144. United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see supra notes
122, 143 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and procedural burdens the pros-
ecutor faced in Lemire).
145. See Olsen, supra note 122, at 1003-05 (discussing the onerous burden the
prosecutor bore in attempting to obtain bank records located in Switzerland).
146. See id. (discussing Swiss investigations in Lemire).
147. United States v. Davis, 767 F. 2d 1025, 1027-29 (2d Cir. 1985).
148. See generally Ellis & Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters: A Comparative Analysis, 19 I'L LAW. 189, 222-23
(1985) (concluding that the Criminal Assistance Treaty often fails to produce quick
enough results).
149. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 2 (listing violations to
which the Treaty is not applicable). A schedule of offenses for which compulsory mea-
sures are available is annexed thereto. Id.
150. Id. There are two escape clauses to the application of the Treaty. Id. at art. 3.
Article 3 (Discretionary Assistance) holds that a country may refuse assistance to the
extent that: "[tihe requested state considers that the execution of the request is likely
to prejudice its sovereignty, security or similar essential interest." Id. at art. 3, para.
1(a). Article 9 (General Provisions for Executing Requests) states that the terms of the
treaty are subordinate to domestic law and national interests. Id. at art. 9, para. 2.
151. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing Switzerland's insis-
tence that the United States Attorney's Office use the Criminal Assistance Treaty).
152. See Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 2, para. l(c)(5) (pro-
viding that the Criminal Assistance Treaty is inapplicable to violations of tax laws); see
also infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the Swiss government's attitude
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tax evasion, the crime Marc Rich allegedly committed, is not an of-
fense for which Switzerland can give assistance.'58 The inapplicability
of the Criminal Assistance Treaty in tax matters rendered the Treaty
useless in Marc Rich."" Moreover, the Treaty is also irrelevant for all
other crimes not listed among the Treaty's schedule of offenses.'6 5 The
Criminal Assistance Treaty, therefore, is not a viable solution to the
"Catch-22" conflict 56 because it does not apply to all circumstances.
The Treaty's two escape clauses further reduce the Criminal Assis-
tance Treaty's effectiveness. 57 Article III allows a state to refuse assis-
tance whenever it deems the request for documents prejudicial to state
sovereignty.1 58 Moreover, article IX allows a state to subordinate the
terms of the Criminal Assistance Treaty to each state's domestic law
and national interest. 59 The escape clauses allow either state to avoid
specific Treaty provisions.'6 0
According to article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, preservation of a
manufacturing or business secret is in Switzerland's national inter-
toward tax evasion and tax fraud).
153. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 2, para. 1(c)(5). See gen-
erally Ellis & Pisani, supra note 148, at 200-01 (stating the offenses for which requests
for assistance "shall not apply" under the Criminal Assistance Treaty).
154. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 4.
155. See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 148, at 199 (commenting that Criminal Assis-
tance Treaty requires a listing of the act among the schedule of offenses before any
assistance is provided).
156. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (noting limited applicability of
the Criminal Assistance Treaty). It is interesting to note that the Criminal Assistance
Treaty only includes names of offenses. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at
art. 2. The Treaty does not define any offenses. Id. This is likely to cause confusion
when courts attempt to administer Treaty provisions.
157. See supra note 150 (discussing the two escape clauses provided in the Crimi-
nal Assistance Treaty).
158. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 3, para. 158 l(a); see
supra note 150 (discussing article 3 and article 9 escape clauses in the Criminal Assis-
tance Treaty).
159. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 9, para. 2.
160. See Note, The Marc Rich Case, supra note 104, at 127 (observing that lan-
guage in the Criminal Assistance Treaty subordinating the Treaty to domestic law and
national interests provides an easy means for a country to avoid Treaty provisions). But
see Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1983, at 3, col. 4 (providing statement of Swiss legal advisor
(Mr. Leutert) concerning use of Criminal Assistance Treaty in Marc Rich). Mr.
Leutert estimated that the United States has been granted nearly all of its 250 requests
under the Criminal Assistance Treaty. Id. He added that at no time did the United
States government request assistance in Marc Rich. Id.
In Marc Rich, the United States government argued, however, that tax matters were
explicitly excluded from the scope of the Criminal Assistance Treaty. Brief for the
Government of the United States at 25, Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (1),
707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983). The United States govern-




est."6 ' The Criminal Assistance Treaty, through articles III and IX,
permits Switzerland to subordinate the Treaty's terms in order to pre-
serve that national interest. 6 2 According to the Treaty's terms, Swit-
zerland can seize documents any time its interests are threatened and
thus resist a grand jury subpoena. The "Catch-22", therefore,
remains.163
Resolution of the Swiss-United States conflict depends on whether
compliance with a request is discretionary.'" If compliance is at the
discretion of the requested state, as in the Criminal Assistance Treaty,
the "Catch-22" will remain unsolved.6 If, on the other hand, a state
must comply with a request regardless of the various interests at stake
then a treaty has a greater probability of remaining viable because it
can satisfy each party's concerns.16
B. CONVENTION FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION:
TAXEs ON INCOME
The Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation: Taxes on In-
come (Tax Convention),' provides for the exchange of information to
161. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing article 273 of the Swiss
Penal Code).
162. Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115, at art. 3, para. l(a) and art. 9,
para. 2 (allowing either Switzerland or the United States to subordinate the terms of
the Criminal Assistance Treaty to preserve their national interests or domestic laws).
163. Id. In the "Catch-22", where an American grand jury subpoena directly chal-
lenges Swiss non-disclosure laws, a sovereignty/national interest concern is always at
issue. The Criminal Assistance Treaty fails to remedy this basic element of the Swit-
zerland-United States conflict because it allows either nation to refuse the release of
documents if they invoke either of the Treaty's two escape clauses (articles 3 and 9).
See generally Comment, A Comparative Analysis of the Efficacy of Bilateral Agree-
ments in Resolving Disputes Between Sovereigns Arising From Extraterritorial Appli-
cation of Antitrust Law: The Australian Agreement, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Coi, p. L. 49,
78 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Comparative Analysis] (acknowledging that it is a
reasonable reaction to construe the inclusion of an escape clause as effectively negating
any binding character of a treaty); Davidow and Chiles, The United States and the
Issue of the Binding of Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regard-
ing Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 268 (1978) (viewing consul-
tation procedures with escape clauses as an approach to conflict resolution that is used
to disguise a basic unwillingness to surrender national discretion).
164. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (noting that agreements contain-
ing escape clauses are incapable of resolving an international conflict).
165. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text (illustrating that discretionary
compliance is fatal to a treaty designed to provide assistance in a "Catch-22").
166. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (advocating the adoption of a
new bilateral treaty without any escape clauses).
167. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation: Taxes on Income, May 24,
1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316 [hereinafter Tax
Convention]. The United States is a party to 42 tax treaties with other nations. See
generally R. RHOADES & M. LANGER, INCOME TAxATIoN OF FOREIGN RELArED
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prevent tax fraud between the United States and Switzerland.,,8 Swiss
legal precedent, however, often renders assistance (exchange of infor-
mation) ineffective.16 9 In 1975, for example, the Swiss Federal Su-
preme Court (Bundesgericht) held that Swiss tax authorities had com-
plied with an IRS business records request when they furnished a
summary of their findings without any documentation.17 0 The Court
reasoned that Switzerland's obligation was to exchange information,
not to provide comprehensive legal assistance . 7 1 The Swiss attitude to-
ward compliance with the Tax Convention undermines the Conven-
tion's effectiveness in dealing with the "Catch-22" between a United
States grand jury subpoena and Swiss nondisclosure laws.172 Even if
the Tax Convention is used, a United States Attorney's Office may not
obtain the needed documents.17 - Swiss authorities could either ignore
the request because tax evasion is not a criminal offense in Switzerland,
or furnish minimal information, adhering to the Swiss Federal Su-
preme Court's earlier holding.1 74 The attitude of United States courts
TRANSACTIONS (1981) (providing the annotated texts of all current United States tax
treaties); J. BISCHEL & R. FEINSCHREIBER, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TAXA-
TION 203-13 (1977) (supplying background and overviews of United States tax
treaties).
168. Tax Convention, supra note 167, at art. 16, para. 1.
169. See Seemann, Exchange of Information Under International Tax Conven-
tions, 17 INT'L LAW. 333, 343 (1983) (observing that in Switzerland, neither tax eva-
sion nor tax fraud is a crime). Hence, neither qualifies for assistance under the Crimi-
nal Assistance Treaty. Id. Furthermore, the Swiss regard tax evasion as a less serious
offense than tax fraud and not meriting international enforcement action. Id.
170. X & Y v. Confederation (Swiss) Tax Administration, 37 AFTR 2d §§ 76-
1282 (Swiss Confederation Supreme Court, no.30 1975). The United States com-
plained that the summary of Swiss findings was incomplete and was not acceptable in
an American court. Seemann, supra note 169, at 343.
171. X & Y v. Confederation (Swiss) Tax Administration, 37 AFTR 2d §§ 76-
1282 (Swiss Confederation Supreme Court, no.30 1975).
172. See id. (providing an example of United States inability to obtain desired in-
formation using the Tax Convention).
173. Id.
174. Id.; cf. Tax Convention, supra note 167, at art. 16, paras. 1 and 3 (providing
Swiss authorities with two alternatives to refuse compliance with a United States re-
quest). Article 16, paragraph 1, provides in pertinent part:
(1) The competent authorities of the contracting States shall exchange such
information (being information available under the respective taxation laws of
the contracting States) as is necessary for carrying out the provision of the pre-
sent Convention or for the prevention of fraud or the like in relation to the taxes
which are the subject of the present Convention . . . .No information shall be
exchanged which would disclose any trade, business, industrial or professional
secret or any trade process.
Id. at art. 16, para. 1. Article 16, paragraph 3 provides:
(3) In no case shall the provisions of this Article be construed so as to impose
upon either of the contracting States the obligation to carry out administrative
measures at variance with the regulations and practice of either contracting
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holding the treaty not the exclusive means of obtaining tax information
from Switzerland further weakens the Tax Convention's effective-
ness.1
75
Failure to require use of the Tax Convention for all tax matters
reduces the Convention's binding effect on party-litigants and negates
the Tax Convention's independent power to compel production of for-
eign-based tax recordsY.18 Moreover, parties recreate the "Catch-22"
between Switzerland and the United States in these matters when they
look to the courts for guidance. Enforcement of a tax document request
pursuant to the Convention again depends on whether compliance is




Customary international law approaches to the grand jury-nondisclo-
sure law conffict fail because each method tends to favor one country
over the other.17 1 Judicial attempts to solve the "Catch-22" also fail
because: (1) they require balancing of competing interests that are vir-
tually impossible to balance (Vetco); 79 and (2) they eventually chal-
lenge the resolve of each nation (Marc Rich). 80 Traditional diplomatic
efforts are unsuccessful because they: (1) are too time-consuming; (2)
are inapplicable to too many situations; (3) permit voluntary compli-
ance through escape clauses; and (4) depend on the judicial process for
State or which would be contrary to its sovereignty, security or public policy, or
to supply particulars which are not procurable under its own legislation or that of
the State making the application.
Id. at art. 16, para. 3.
175. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1328 (9th Cir. 1981). Vetco
argued that the Swiss-United States Tax Convention precluded the use of an IRS sum-
mons to obtain records held in Switzerland. Id. The court in Vetco held, however, that
there is nothing in the Convention that bars the use of IRS summonses to gather infor-
mation. Id. at 1328-29. The court in Vetco also observed that there was no indication
of exclusivity in the Convention's legislative history. Id.
176. Cf. Seemann, supra note 169, at 338 (observing that even if the requesting
nation meets all requirements set forth in the Tax Convention, it is not guaranteed that
the requested information is forthcoming).
177. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (noting that a treaty that sub-
jects compliance with an information request to a state's national interests is incapable
of resolving a "Catch-22").
178. See supra notes 28-63 and accompanying text (maintaining that the approach
of customary international law to this "Catch-22" is ineffective because a governing
body must ultimately choose one basic right over another).
179. See supra notes 64-99 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacies of
the balancing test articulated in Vetco).
180. See supra notes 100-26 and accompanying text (discussing the undesirable
results in Marc Rich after underestimating the resolve of the Swiss government).
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enforcement. 181 Commentators propose various solutions,182 but courts
have failed to accept any one suggestion.
Any attempt to reconcile the broad powers of the American grand
jury with the restrictive prohibitions of Swiss non-disclosure law must
overcome deficiencies of the prior solutions. A new solution, therefore,
is needed to resolve the Swiss-United States conflict. A modified ver-
sion of the foreign-business copy reproduction legislation is one viable
solution. 83
A. NEW BILATERAL TREATY MODIFYING PAST LEGISLATION
In 1952, Congress introduced legislation requiring foreign companies
transacting business in the United States, and United States companies
doing business abroad, to keep duplicates of all records in the United
States available on demand for production. 8 The legislation failed be-
cause opposition in the international community saw this legislation as
a direct infringement on their sovereign rights. 85 The abundance of
181. See supra notes 127-77 and accompanying text (establishing the major defi-
ciencies of the relevant treaties to the United States-Switzerland conflict).
182. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Introduction: Discovering Discovery: International Style,
16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 957, 959 (1984) (proposing amendment of the Hague
Convention on the taking of evidence abroad by applying a jurisdictional rule of rea-
son); April & Fried, Compelling Discovery and Disclosure in Transnational Criminal
Litigation-A Canadian View, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 961, 968 (1984) (re-
jecting Lowenfeld's proposal and suggesting that customary international law is the
proper solution); Olsen, supra note 122, at 1027 (advocating use of legislation to
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow more liberal authentication procedures
for foreign documents); Note, The Marc Rich Case, supra note 104, at 127 (recom-
mending international treaties as the best method of resolving jurisdictional disputes);
Comment, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra note 30, at 623-28 (suggesting four-step
approach in solving document disputes through the use of letters rogatory).
183. See H.R. REs. 7339, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG. REc. 3332 (1952) (origi-
nally requiring production of documents abroad from United States corporations). The
bill also required forcing corporations to enter into an agreement to produce documents
related to their business. Id. The bill failed largely because of international outrage
that demanded a reciprocal burden on United States companies to produce their docu-
ments in a foreign locale. See generally Comment, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra
note 30, at 621-22 (discussing the reasons for the bill's original failure).
184. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the earlier legislation
as proposed). The bill would have amended the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-13, 14-
21, 22-27, 44 (1976) (as amended) to require document production from foreign com-
panies and United States companies transacting business abroad. H.R. RES. 7339, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess., 98 CONG. REC. 3332 (1952).
185. See Comment, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws, supra note 30, at 622 (explain-
ing that "the same international hostilities . . . preventing negotiation of a treaty ...
[also] interfere with the enactment of domestic legislation").
In 1961, the House of Representatives voted to amend § 21 of the Shipping Act of
1916, 46 U.S.C. § 820 (1970) (as amended), to require common carriers by water to
produce business records "wherever located." H.R. REs. 6775, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1961) (describing the proposed amendment). The amendment encountered substantial
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successfully negotiated treaties18 and bilateral agreements'6 7 since
1952, however, suggests that international hostility towards a similar
enactment has subsided and successful negotiation of a new agreement
between the United States and Switzerland is now more likely.,8
The new bilateral treaty would differ from the unsuccessful 1952 leg-
islation in that the treaty would require corporations to keep duplicate
business records in both Switzerland and the United States. Swiss com-
panies doing business in the United States, as a prerequisite to those
operations, would keep copies of all business records in the United
States. Similarly, United States companies transacting business in
Switzerland, as a prerequisite to conducting business there, would
maintain copies of all business records in Switzerland. The 1952 legis-
lation only required foreign companies to keep copies of their records
available in the United States.8 9 The legislation imposed no reciprocal
burden on United States companies conducting business abroad to keep
a set of records in each foreign location.
In addition to the reciprocal record requirement, the new agreement
must include other provisions. First, it would amend the Federal Rules
of Evidence to facilitate the introduction of duplicate business
records. 190 Second, it would amend the tax code to allow a business
international opposition, however, and the Senate abandoned it. 107 CONG. REc. 21,
143 (1961) (statement of Sen. Engle).
186. See, e.g., Criminal Assistance Treaty, supra note 115 (operating treaty be-
tween the United States and Switzerland); Tax Convention, supra note 167 (acting
convention on tax matters between Switzerland and United States); The Hague Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for
signature, March 8, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 84 U.N.T.S. 231, codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1982) & (Supp. 1983) (including both United States and
Switzerland as signatories pledged to assist in the taking of evidence abroad).
187. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (listing various bilateral agree-
ments to which the United States is a party).
188. Bilateral agreements are frequently used in antitrust matters to resolve con-
flicts and provide a means for cooperation. See, e.g., Agreement Relating to Coopera-
tion on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.AS. No. 10365,
reprinted in, 21 I.L.M. 702 (providing a bilateral framework for resolving antitrust
conflicts and limiting impairment of national sovereignty concerns); Canada-United
States: Joint Statement Concerning Cooperation in Antitrust Matters, U.S. Dep't of
Justice (press release Nov. 3, 1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 1305 (1969) (setting forth
informal procedures for antitrust notification and consultation); Agreement Relating to
Mutual Cooperation on Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-
Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291 (providing frame-
work whereby antitrust authorities of one party will cooperate and render assistance to
the other party's antitrust authorities). See generally Comment, A Comparative Analy-
sis, supra note 163, at 49-55 (assessing the success of the Australian agreement in
terms of the Canadian and German Agreements).
189. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (providing requirements of the
original legislation).
190. See Olsen, supra note 122, at 1027 (suggesting the amendment of the Federal
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expense deduction for the cost of keeping a duplicate set of records.
Third, it would establish detailed notification and consultation proce-
dures to reduce friction between the United States and Switzerland.""1
Fourth, it would require each country to judicially and administratively
assist the other regarding document requests.192 Fifth, it would prohibit
Switzerland from automatically blocking compliance with a United
States request provided that prior notice of the request is given to Swiss
authorities.193 Finally, for all documents allegedly pertaining to secur-
ity interests, the new treaty would require in camera inspection to de-
termine whether the documents must remain confidential.1 94
B. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED BILATERAL TREATY
Provisions concerning reciprocal enforcement and in camera inspec-
tion of confidential materials address Swiss concerns regarding in-
fringement of their national sovereignty due to the broad reach of the
American grand jury. 95 Furthermore, likelihood of the treaty's success
is great because: (1) reciprocal enforcement does not favor one country
over the other; 98 (2) corporate compliance is a prerequisite to con-
ducting business in the respective countries; (3) courts would not have
to balance competing interests;19 7 (4) the resolve of each government
would no longer apply; 98 and (5) no escape clauses exist to frustrate
compliance.19
Rules of Evidence to facilitate the introduction of duplicate records).
191. Cf. Note, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 163, at 63 (observing that no-
tification procedure was instrumental in easing tensions between the United States and
Australia).
192. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text (observing that the Tax Con-
vention's exchange of information requirement resulted in the United States' inability
to obtain requested information). Judicial and administrative assistance should allow
the proposed treaty to circumvent the Tax Convention's deficiency.
193. See Note, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 163, at 63-64, 74-75 (main-
taining that a similar provision in Australian Agreement is essential to bilateral agree-
ment's effectiveness).
194. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (providing for in camera inspection to maintain
trade secrets). This provision attempts to achieve the same success as in domestic civil
litigation.
195. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text (discussing Swiss penal provi-
sions designed to block the reach of the American grand jury).
196. See supra notes 28-63 and accompanying text (citing favoritism towards one
nation's interests as reason for customary international law's failure to resolve this
"Catch-22").
197. See supra notes 64-99 and accompanying text (noting that the balancing test
was incapable of resolving disputes).
198. See supra notes 100-26 and accompanying text (noting that United States
Attorney's Office's underestimation of Swiss resolve led to the creation of this "Catch-
22" in Marc Rich).




The 1952 legislation failed because it only burdened foreign corpora-
tions.200 While it required a foreign company to keep business records
in the United States, United States firms did not have a similar obliga-
tion abroad."' As a result, foreign governments believed the legislation
infringed their sovereign rights.20 2
Sovereignty is a significant issue in the "Catch-22."20 3 Switzerland
perceives a grand jury subpoena for Swiss business records as a threat
to its sovereignty.204 The new agreement, however, would dissipate
some of these tensions.20 5 Swiss companies would not have a greater
burden because, under the proposed treaty, United States companies
would have the same obligation in Switzerland.10 Both nations are
more likely to agree to a treaty in which both are faced with equal
burdens.207 Moreover, a duplicate copy requirement would substantially
assist each government in its criminal investigations of foreign
businesses.
2. Treaty As A Prerequisite to Doing Business
Companies that desire to conduct business overseas would have to
comply with the treaty.20 8 This prerequisite to transacting business
would also solve the problems associated with Swiss nondisclosure
laws.20 9 Subpoena requests would apply to records kept within the
United States. A company that keeps copies of all its records within the
Attorney's Office's underestimation of Swiss resolve led to the creation of this "Catch-
22" in Marc Rich).
200. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (establishing nonreciprocal burden
as a major reason for earlier legislation's failure).
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (observing the international
hostility toward the 1952 bill because it was perceived as threatening a sovereign's
independence).
203. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (maintaining that Swiss nondisclo-
sure laws are designed to protect the sovereign rights of Swiss citizens).
204. See supra notes 13-21 and accompanying text (noting Swiss sovereignty as a
basis for nondisclosure laws).
205. See supra notes 188-90, 192 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of
new treaty that specifically addresses American and Swiss concerns).
206. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text (establishing equal burdens on
both Swiss and United States companies in regard to document production).
207. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (observing that nonreciprocal bur-
den is major reason for earlier legislation's failure).
208. See supra notes 164-77 (suggesting that a way to resolve compliance problems
of earlier treaties is to require companies to comply prior to any conflict).
209. See supra notes 64-126 and accompanying text (discussing judicial problems
with having to order compliance despite nondisclosure laws).
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domestic forum is subject only to the laws of that forum. Swiss nondis-
closure laws would have no impact on the records of a Swiss company
doing business in the United States because duplicates of the docu-
ments would exist outside Switzerland. The prerequisite requirement
would also achieve high compliance rates because a company is more
likely to opt to comply with the treaty rather than forsake potential
profits. Moreover, a firm has little reason to resist compliance unless it
anticipates conducting unlawful activities. In this way, the treaty acts
in a preventive manner.
3. Excising Judicial Balancing
Under the proposed treaty, resolution of the conflict between the
American grand jury and Swiss nondisclosure laws no longer include
the various balancing tests courts used in the past.210 A fundamental
problem of past judicial solutions was requiring courts to balance com-
peting interests incapable of objective balancing.21 These judicial bal-
ancing attempts resulted in nonuniform enforcement and the losing sov-
ereign's general disregard for the decision.212
The new bilateral treaty eliminates judicial balancing. A corporation
must make documents available before any business is conducted.
Courts, therefore, will not consider restrictive foreign laws in ordering
compliance with a subpoena. Rather, they will look only to domestic
rules of procedure for guidance.
A court's role, however, includes enforcing the bilateral agreement.
Failure to abide by the treaty's procedures (e.g., a company does not
keep copies of its records in the foreign location) constitutes a per se
violation of the agreement. A court's responsibility includes assessing
fines in accordance with the proposed bilateral treaty's penal provision.
The penalty for noncompliance sufficiently outweighs any cost of keep-
ing a duplicate set of records. This function does not entail any balanc-
ing of competing interests.
4. Government Resolve No Longer A Factor
A likely reason the United States Attorney's Office pursued a sub-
210. See supra notes 64-99 and accompanying text (suggesting that judicial bal-
ancing is incapable of resolving this conflict because courts cannot objectively balance
Swiss and United States interests).
211. Id.
212. Id.; see also Marc Rich and Co., A.G. v. United States (I), 707 F.2d 663 (2d
Cir.) (illustrating total disregard in enforcing the subpoena when Switzerland subse-
quently seized the requested documents), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
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poena in Marc Rich is that the attorneys underestimated the resolve of
the Swiss in enforcing their laws. Through the proposed treaty's notifi-
cation and consultation procedure, a similar miscalculation would not
result.2 13 Instead, Switzerland and the United States would keep each
other fully informed as to each document request.
These cooperative provisions are designed to alleviate international
tensions and eliminate perceived threats to sovereignty.21 4 If successful,
a nation's resolve would no longer concern the requesting state. Each
country would face similar burdens and each country would possess all
the relevant information. Consequently, the likelihood of a misunder-
standing would diminish and a nation's resolve would not play an im-
portant part in achieving compliance.
5. Escape Clause Elimination
Eliminating escape clauses is the most controversial part of the pro-
posed treaty.21 5 Understandably, the United States and Switzerland
will demand a degree of flexibility and discretion to protect their vital
interests. 1 6 The realization that an escape clause would render a docu-
ment-production treaty ineffective should temper this reaction. 17
In the business record area, most document requests involve conflict-
ing national interests (i.e., Swiss secrecy concerns and United States
investigatory needs) .2 1 Therefore, any request has the possibility of be-
ing refused. Companies will instinctively violate a treaty if enforcement
seems unlikely. Moreover, attorneys may ignore treaty procedures be-
cause their voluntary nature lessens the treaty's usefulness.
A treaty without escape clauses will result in substantial adherence
to the treaty provisions as governments must use the mechanisms pro-
vided to assist a criminal investigation involving foreign-based business
records. Moreover, the treaty will reward attorneys' efforts through
timely procurement of the requested information. Furthermore, the
213. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (observing that similar provision
in Australian Agreement alleviated mounting tensions between Australia and the
United States).
214. Id.
215. See Note, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 163, at 78-80 (maintaining
that escape clause is essential to the Australian-United States treaty).
216. Cf. id. (demanding an escape clause to preserve basic sovereign rights in the
Australian Agreement).
217. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (maintaining that inclusion of
two escape clauses in the Criminal Assistance Treaty is the main reason for the
Treaty's ineffectiveness).
218. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (maintaining that document pro-
duction requests are likely to involve competing national interests).
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treaty's in camera exception will allow governments to protect their na-
tional interests.2 19 Unlike an escape clause, however, a nonpartisan
body will determine the records' importance and/or confidentiality.
Compliance will not depend on the decision of a biased government
body.
CONCLUSION
Corporate defendants face a "Catch-22" when a United States grand
jury subpoenas business records maintained in Switzerland. If the cor-
porate defendant complies with the subpoena, it faces criminal sanc-
tions for violating Swiss nondisclosure laws. If the defendant observes
the Swiss laws and does not comply with the subpoena it is subject to a
finding of contempt, a fine and/or imprisonment in the United States.
Customary international law, judicial decisions, treaties and com-
mentators have all failed to resolve the American grand jury-Swiss
nondisclosure law conflict. A new bilateral treaty requiring duplicate
copies of all business records kept in the United States and Switzerland
would effectively resolve this conflict. The agreement would establish a
meaningful flow of cooperation and eliminate the reasons for Swiss
nondisclosure laws. The bilateral treaty would achieve these results be-
cause it would place equal burdens on each nation thereby making
compliance mandatory and limiting a nation's alternatives for refusing
to comply.
It is naive to view this proposed bilateral agreement as a means to
eliminate completely the international strife over document disclosure.
Transnational cooperation in record production is not easily achieved.
The proposed United States-Switzerland agreement, however, ad-
dresses the major concerns that presently prevent resolution of the
grand jury-nondisclosure law conflict. In confronting the primary ob-
stacles to agreement, it is hoped that the "Catch-22" may be
eliminated.
219. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (advocating use of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c) to act as a guideline for in camera inspection).
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